I. INTRODUCTION The war in Vietnam is illegal and immoral. The question is, What can we do to stop that war? What can we do to stop the people who, in the name of America, are killing babies, women, and children? We have to say to ourselves that there's a higher law than the law of a fool named [Dean] Rusk; there's a higher law than the law of a buffoon named [Lyndon] Johnson. It's the law of each of us. We will not murder anybody who they say kill, and if we decide to kill, we 're going to decide who it shall be. This country will only stop the war in actions that seemed less overt and provocative than his, most notably the Boston Five, which included well-known pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock and respected clergyman the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr.," who were charged with conspiracy to aid and abet draft evasion, among other things. 12 On top of all this, President Lyndon B. Johnson and other prominent political leaders strongly advocated for the prosecution of Stokely Carmichael. 13 The target of these coercive efforts and the individual who princigally held Carmichael's fate in his hands was Attorney General Ramsey Clark. As the chief prosecutor for the United States, the decision of whether or not to prosecute was ultimately his, and he steadfastly refused to pursue an indictment-much to the dismay of President Johnson. 15 Was Clark's refusal a courageous stand that exemplified the ideal of a truly independent public prosecutor? Was it weak capitulation to avoid being labeled as unsympathetic to the plight of blacks in America during a racially charged period in our history? 16 Or was it something else altogether, possibly some deeply personal, unarticulated motivation? And, perhaps most importantly, did the decision not to charge Stokely Carmichael, whatever its basis, constitute a proper exercise of Clark's discretion as a prosecutor?
It is well established that prosecutors have enormously broad discretion in making charging decisions, both in terms of the nature of the potential crime to be charged and whether a given charge should even be pursued.17 The only nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent"); O'Meara, supra note 5, at 1108-10 (arguing that Carmichael's rhetoric was akin to the classic example of someone falsely yelling fire in a movie theater, which is plainly not constitutionally protected). But see WILKINS, supra note 9, at 231; Maurice Kelman, On [McPherson] felt that Ramsey [Clark] had so intense a concern that he not be regarded as an anticivil libertarian that he was letting go of one of the main reins of power that the public expects an Attorney General to exercise, which was the prosecuting function."). (2009) (providing that a "prosecutor in the criminal case shall: ... refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause").
See generally JESSICA MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK, THE REV. WILLIAM SLOANE COFFIN, JR., MICHAEL FERBER, MITCHELL GOODMAN, AND MARCUS RASKIN (1969)
The guidelines for U.S. Attorneys, which do not have the force of law, contain a somewhat more exacting standard or aspirational measure with regard to charging decisions. The comment to section 9-27.220 of the U.S. Attorney's Manual provides that "both as a matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact." U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, § 9-27.220 cmt. (1997).
In a similar vein, the non-binding American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice maintain that:
A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9(a) (1992).
19.
See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (" [T] he decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification' . . . ."
(quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364)); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, § 9-27.260 (1997) (providing that prosecutors should not consider "race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activities or beliefs" in making charging decisions). A related limitation on prosecutors in making charging decisions is that they must not prosecute a defendant in order to penalize the defendant for exercising a constitutional or statutory right. Prosecuting for this reason would constitute "vindictive prosecution" a violation of the defendant's due process rights. See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 ("To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional."' (citation omitted) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33 n.20 (1973))).
20. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 15 (expressing the view that "[p]robable cause is a very low evidentiary threshold" and "has been criticized as inadequate to meet the prosecutor's overriding obligations as a minister of justice"); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 4:9 (2d ed. 2002) (observing that findings of discriminatory enforcement on the part of prosecutors are rare); Gershman, supra note 17, at 513 n.2 ("The doctrines of selective, Indeed, there is a legitimate perception that prosecutors are prone to exploit the ephemeral "probable cause" constraint, at times charging or overcharging defendants founded on evidence admittedly too insubstantial to establish guilt. 2 And claims of selective prosecution based on race or some other protected status are nearly impossible to prove. 22 Outrage, accompanied by claims of abuse of discretion and prosecutorial misconduct, are not uncharacteristic responses to 23 24 questionable charging decisions, but almost always without consequence.
vindictive, and bad faith prosecutions provide modest constraints on the prosecutor's charging http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545937 (observing that the "probable cause" standard is "inherently quite minimal; it only requires enough evidence for the individual prosecutor subjectively to think it is more likely than not that the person committed the crime"). see also Alfieri, supra at 1290 (indicating that the district attorney amended the original indictment by adding attempted second-degree murder).
Following an avalanche of criticism, including demonstrations reminiscent of bygone days of the civil rights movement, the prosecutor reduced the charges to lesser crimes. around the world-not only because of the stiff charges brought against the black teenagers, but because of the stark contrast between the way black boys and white boys in the same town were treated.").
Notwithstanding the lowering of the charges, the prosecutor still wrongfully insisted upon trying the first defendant-seventeen-year-old Mychal Bell-as an adult on charges of aggravated second degree battery and conspiracy to commit second degree battery. See Podgor, supra at 468 (observing that it was improper to try Bell as an adult on these charges as he was facing them for the Refusals to initiate criminal proceedings, on the other hand, despite what may seem to be compelling evidence of guilt, do not typically elicit as strong of a public reaction25 nor are such decisions normally called into question. 26In fact, they are essentially impervious to any sort of meaningful scrutiny,27 left wholly to a prosecutor's subjective assessment of the facts and evidence involved. 28 Notwithstanding the Teflon nature of a prosecutor's charging decision, Attorney General Ramsey Clark's refusal to prosecute Stokely Carmichael and his contemporaneous prosecution of the all-white Boston Five raise a legitimate question with regard to his exercise of discretion. This Article examines the fascinating people, evidence, and sociopolitical influences that Clark faced while first time); Miguel Bustillo, 'Jena Six' Teenager is Freed on Bail, L.A. TEVIES, Sept. 28, 2007, at Al0 (noting that a Louisiana appeals court vacated the verdict convicting Bell of aggravated battery and conspiracy to commit aggravated battery on the ground that he was unlawfully tried as an adult). While certainly criticized for his charging decisions, the prosecutor was apparently never subjected to any sort of professional censure.
24. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 23-24 (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08) (discussing the judicial deference accorded to prosecutors' charging decisions); GERSHMAN, supra note 20, § 4:3 (noting the "extraordinary deference" historically afforded to prosecutors with regard to charging and the rarity of a judical challenge); Podgor, supra note 23, at 464 ("Although courts may mention improper conduct on the part of the prosecutor when dismissing charges, the prosecutorial conduct is seldom the exclusive basis for the dismissal of the charges.").
25.
See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 17, at 535 (observing the tendency to view prosecutors' exercise of discretion in this regard as not being a concern "on the ground that only acts of leniency are involved"). [T] he decision to forego charges is entirely within the discretion of the prosecutor."); LaFave, supra note 17, at 538 ("Although the American criminal justice system has reasonably effective controls to ensure that the prosecutor does not abuse his power by prosecuting upon less than sufficient evidence, there are-as a practical matter-no comparable checks upon his discretionary judgment of whether or not to prosecute one against whom sufficient evidence exists."); infra note 222 and accompanying text.
See

28.
See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 3-3.9(b) ("The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction."); Medwed, supra note 20, at 11 (noting that the prosecutorial charging standard in "almost every jurisdiction is entirely subjective"); Ronald Dworkin, On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 6, 1968, at 14 ("A prosecutor may properly decide not to press charges if the lawbreaker is young, or inexperienced, or the sole support of a family, or is repentant, or turns state's evidence, or if the law is unpopular or unworkable or generally disobeyed, or if the courts are clogged with more important cases, or for dozens of other reasons."); infra note 223 and accompanying text.
navigating through a daunting prosecutorial minefield, and critically analyzes the legal propriety of the course he ultimately chose.
The Article first provides significant personal details about both Ramsey Clark and Stokely Carmichael, with an emphasis on Clark's impressive civil rights pedigree 29 and Carmichael's putatively unlawful anti-Vietnam War 30 activities.
It then proceeds to explore Clark's refusal to prosecute Carmichael,1 a decision that reportedly involved an exhaustive investigation into the underlying facts that might have supported federal charges. 32 While he maintained that the evidence was lacking and held that up as his explanation for not pursuing Carmichael, 33 this portion of the Article calls into question Clark's tidy rationale, given its narrow focus on the ambiguous crime of "conspiracy to incite a riot." 34 In particular, there seems to have been ample support for proceeding against Carmichael on separate and more easily provable charges related to "aiding and abetting draft evasion," the principal foundation for Clark's prosecution of the Boston Five. 35 The Article concludes with a probing examination of the propriety of Ramsey Clark's non-prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, an exercise of prosecutorial discretion undoubtedly influenced by the substance of
36
Carmichael's racially-themed antiwar message. More precisely, Carmichael's rhetoric surely resonated with Clark in light of his well-documented commitment to securing equal rights for black Americans. 37 Was this, however, a valid ground on which to forego prosecution, especially considering its direct link to race?
In the end, when assessed against the backdrop of Clark's temporally related and factually weaker prosecution of the all-white Boston Five, his decision may aptly be described as an act of "prosecutorial indiscretion." This involved in organizing the federal government's efforts to monitor and contain these volatile situations,5 and he faced escalating social and political pressure to prosecute black radicals whom many viewed as responsible. 59 High on this list of militant targets was none other than Stokely Carmichael. 60 
B. Stokely Carmichael: "Hell no, we won't go!"
A native of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, Stokely Standiford Churchill Carmichael61 moved to the South Bronx in the summer of 1952.62 Intellectually curious and gifted, Carmichael excelled academically throughout his youth, notably being one of the few black students chosen for admission to the elite Bronx High School of Science. 63 After graduating from high school, he chose to attend Howard University, principally because of his strong attraction to the sophisticated and politically active Nonviolent Action Group (NAG), an unofficial student organization at the university that was affiliated with the better 
60.
See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text. In addition to Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, members of the Black Panther Party were also the subject of blame for the urban unrest during the late 1960s, and there were widespread calls for an intense government response to their reputedly subversive activities. See Brown, supra note 38, at 84. Though the Black Panthers advocated violence and spoke apocalyptically of the impending "revolution," Ramsey Clark refused to target them in the manner urged by many powerful figures at that time. Id. He was unwilling "to blame black militants for riots or to use them as a scapegoat to avoid confronting problems of poverty and racial discrimination." ELLIFF, supra note 57, at 149. Interestingly, following the election of President Nixon, Clark's successor as Attorney General, John Mitchell, took a decidedly more aggressive approach to the Black Panthers. See Brown, supra note 38, at 85.
61. For a discussion of the derivation of his somewhat ostentatious moniker, see STOKELY Carmichael's committed involvement with NAG eventually led to a larger role within SNCC67-culminating in his election as the organization's chairman in 1966 through his defeat of future civil rights icon John Lewis. 68 Skeptical of and disenchanted with the traditional civil rights movement's strategy of 69 nonviolent resistance, Carmichael was prepared to take the organization in a decidedly more combative direction.
70
Once in charge, he quickly altered SNCC's image and course, calling for rebellion and violence, if necessary, and popularizin the controversial "Black Power" mantra and correlative movement. For too many years, black Americans marched and had their heads broken and got shot.... After years of this, we are at almost the same point-because we demonstrated from a position of weakness. We cannot be expected any longer to march and have our heads broken in order to say to whites: Come on, you're nice guys. For you are not nice guys. We have found you out. Our history demonstrates that the reward for trying to coexist in peace has been the physical and psychological murder of our peoples. We have been lynched, our houses have been bombed and our churches burned. Now we are being shot down like dogs in the streets by white racist policemen. We can no longer accept this oppression without retribution. We Want, supra note 69, at 21 ("SNCC reaffirms the right of black men everywhere to defend themselves when threatened or attacked. As for initiating the use of violence, we hope that such programs as ours will make that unnecessary; but it is not for us to tell black communities whether they can or cannot use any particular form of action to resolve their problems."); HALBERSTAM, supra note 68, at 526 ("What fascinated Carmichael ... was nothing less than the idea of revolution and the use of violence to achieve a revolution."). For a detailed discussion of "Black Power" as 72. See Kaufman, supra note 2 (noting that following Carmichael's release from his twentyseventh arrest, he began to promote use of the phrase "Black Power": "We been saying 'Freedom' The crowd obediently responded with shouts of "Black [P]ower!" 7 4
See
Following this speech, which took place on the heels of the historic continuation of James Meredith's "March Against Fear" (led by Martin Luther King, Jr., Carmichael, and other civil rights notables), 75 the New York Times reported that, with Stokely Carmichael as its leader, a "new philosophy" of Black Power was for six years .... What we are going to start saying now is 'Black Power!"'); JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 141-42 (discussing the unveiling of SNCC's "Black Power" slogan in Greenwood, Mississippi); LEWIS WITH D'ORSO, supra note 2, at 371 (explaining that Carmichael adopted the phrase "Black Power" after seeing SNCC staffer Willie Ricks excite crowds with the phrase). 
TAYLOR BRANCH, AT
1966
, at 1). The march began in Memphis, Tennessee and was to conclude in Jackson, Mississippi; however, on the second day of his quest, Meredith was shot. JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 133. Although he would fully recover, he could not continue with his march at that time; therefore, Dr. King, Stokely Carmichael, and many others did so for him. In the year and a half that followed, Stokely Carmichael became a force to be reckoned with in the civil rights movement' and more broadly within the expanding antiwar context. 79 He was resolute in his general opposition to the Vietnam War but was adamant that blacks should take no part whatsoever in what he considered to be a racist conflict. We maintain that America's cry of "preserve freedom in the world" is a hypocritical mask behind which it squashes liberation movements which are not bound, and refuse to be bound, by the United States' cold war policies. We see no reason for black men, who are daily murdered physically and mentally in this country, to go and kill yellow people abroad, who have done nothing to us and are, in fact, victims of the same oppression. We will not support LBJ's racist war in Vietnam. 81 On a separate occasion, Carmichael pointedly highlighted the hypocrisy and audacity of the government's enlisting of black men to fight in Vietnam-"Hell, no. We won't go. They expect us to run in Harlem and fight in Hanoi? They must be crazy." 82 (D.C.), July 21, 2006, at B6; see also Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 53 ("It is sometimes ironic that many of the peace groups have begun to call SNCC violent and say they can no longer support us, when we are in fact the most militant organization for peace or civil rights or human rights against the war in Vietnam in this country today."). Any black man fighting in the war in Vietnam is nothing but a black mercenary. Any time a black man leaves the country where he can't vote to supposedly deliver the vote to somebody else, he's a black mercenary. Any time a black man leaves this country, gets shot in Vietnam on foreign ground, and returns home and you won't give him a burial place in his own homeland, he's a black mercenary.84
Contrary to the peaceful opposition language that many within the antiwar movement employed, Carmichael's rhetoric was ominously tinged with endorsements of violence in the aid of resistance. 85 For example, at the birthday benefit for imprisoned Black Panther Party co-founder and Minister of Defense
86
Huey P. Newton, Carmichael stated:
For us the question is not going to Vietnam any more, the question is how we can protect our brothers who do not go to Vietnam from going to jail so that when one brother says "Hell, no," there're enough people in that community around him, so that if they dare come in, they are going to face maximum damage in their community. 87 While noted for his oratorical skills, it is important to stress that Carmichael did not merely "talk the talk" in opposing the Vietnam War; he literally put his words into action. For example, on one occasion he personally escorted fellow 83. Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 53. In a similar vein, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. observed the irony of the government sending black men "eight thousand miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia SNCC leader Cleveland Sellers to his Army induction ceremony, at which Sellers famously refused induction.
Carmichael's hip, militant, and mesmerizing oratory, combined with his innate charisma and good looks, transformed him into a veritable rock star within the civil rights (Black Power) and antiwar movements. 89 His irreverent contempt for the white power structure and persistent calls for effecting change through the exertion of Black Power 90 inspired awestruck blacks but alarmed many whites, 91 including President Lyndon Johnson. 92 In fact, President Johnson became somewhat fixated on Carmichael and viewed him as one of his principal antagonists on both the civil rights 9 3 and Vietnam War fronts. 94 He even went so far as to demand regular weekly reports from the FBI concerning Carmichael's conduct. 95 (Aug. 10, 1966) , available at http://foia.fbi.gov/carmichael stokely/carmichael stokelypart0l.pdf) (observing that Johnson's special assistant requested the provision of updates "at least several times a week" (internal quotation marks omitted)). frustration over the escalating unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the increasing prevalence of rioting as an apparent mode of civil rights protest caused him to push for the prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, among others.
Interestingly, the proposed ground for prosecution that the President and his cabinet advocated was "conspiracy to incite riots" rather than antiwar-related 97 charges.
Several members of Congress, however, openly pressed for an indictment based on violation of draft laws, 98 as did many citizens. 99 In addition to, and perhaps in aid of, calls for the criminal prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, the FBI and even Vice President Hubert Humphrey sought to employ enhanced microphone surveillance of his activities. 100 After Assistant FBI Director Deke DeLoach informed Humphrey of certain public remarks by Carmichael, which included insults of prominent White House officials and expressions of open opposition to the draft, Humphrey reacted sharply. 101 He was "'sick and tired' of hearing about Carmichael" and issued a directive, through DeLoach, to Ramsey Clark that he approve the wiretap. 102 In general, Clark fervently opposed wiretapping and, throughout his tenure as Attorney General, consistently thwarted FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's efforts in this regard. 103 Thus, it was not surprising that Clark resisted permitting microphone surveillance of Stokely Carmichael.
He offered specific reasons for his reluctance. The first, ironically, was because of the potential for imminent criminal prosecution of Carmichael.
10 5 Perhaps more significantly, Clark expressed the view that Carmichael's notoriety as a civil rights leader, as well as the possible recriminations that might flow from a leak regarding such surveillance, presented too great of a risk. 10 As such, Clark held fast to his stance concerning surveillance of Carmichael, resisting the strong desires of other members of the Johnson Administration. He likewise rebuffed the potent calls for Carmichael's criminal prosecution.
III. RAMSEY CLARK'S REFUSAL TO PROSECUTE STOKELY CARMICHAEL
A. Impetus Behind Calls for Prosecution
Admittedly, Stokely Carmichael's confrontational approach to securing civil rights for black citizens was distasteful to many white leaders, especially President Johnson. 107 He clearly preferred dealing with the more traditional civil rights leaders of the old guard, such as NAACP President Roy Wilkins and Urban League Chair Whitney Young, who were very supportive of and cooperative with his Administration. 108 to the plight of black citizens 109 and was concededly working with these leaders to enhance the status of blacks in America, albeit at a somewhat patient, measured pace. 110 Carmichael and other principals of the new guard, however, were convinced that the only way to achieve equal stature in American society was through the establishment and assertion of Black Power, which included resorting to violence, if necessary. 1 Johnson viewed Carmichael's less palatable style as a significant impediment to Johnson's efforts to push his civil rights agenda. 1 12 Whites felt threatened and angry, and these emotions translated into reticence on the part of elected officials in Washington.113 Furthermore, the urban racial unrest that seethed in major metropolitan areas in the years following the Watts riots114 was popularly attributed to militant black leaders, such as Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, and others within the burgeoning Black Power movement. 
110.
See, e.g., WILKINS, supra note 9, at 205-07 (stating that Johnson told a gathering of black civil rights leaders, including Martin Luther King, Jr., Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young, that "they had to be patient. All the things that had to be done couldn't be done at once.").
111. Apr. 27, 1968, at lA ("The cities of our nation, ... are being burned not by 12-year-olds but by bandits, looters and arsonists who are potential mass murderers, reacting to the agitation of the Stokely Carmichaels and H. Rap Browns of our society." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 116. See BRANCH, supra note 73, at 451 ("The dissenters unhinged Johnson. To him, they undermined the tenuous hopes for military success without offering an honest alternative, which made them disloyal, impractical, and unprincipled all at once."). War's rising unpopularity was having a devastating effect on his potential legacy, which fueled an almost maniacal obsession with the conflict. 18 Johnson came to view any opposition to the War as a personal affront, 119 and he had absolutely no tolerance for antiwar activists who promoted draft evasion.120 Carmichael, therefore, represented a sharp thorn in the President's side-one that he desperately wanted removed.
1 2 1 An effective method for doing so seemed to be a successful federal criminal prosecution.122
While a potential charge against Carmichael under the SSA for knowingly aiding and abetting draft evasion would appear to have been a logical and viable basis for prosecution, this was not the crime for which Carmichael was investigated. Instead, President Johnson pushed for, and Ramsey Clark concentrated his investigation upon, a possible indictment for conspiracy to incite a riot.
B. Conspiracy to Incite a Riot
The dramatic shift within the civil rights movement from peaceful nonviolence to militant, aggressive calls for Black Power was viewed by many as a ma or contributor to the disturbing race riots of the "long, hot summer" of 1967.12 There were certainly other plausible explanations for the tumultuous events of that period. Specifically, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (better known as the "Kerner Commission")-which the President charged with the task of investigating the causes of the riots-concluded (much AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM 321 (1995) (indicating that the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam increased from 184,300 in December 1965 to 485,600 in December 1967).
See, e.g., GEORGE C. HERRING, LBJ AND VIETNAM 135-50 (1994) (discussing the
Johnson Administration's efforts to "sell the war" to the public and highlighting Johnson's "[h]ypersensitiv[ity] to the political implications of anything that concerned the war," which fueled an obsession with trying to control public opinion). Tower, who blamed the riots throughout the nation on "the agitation of the Stokely Carmichaels and H. Rap Browns of our society").
See, e.g., DAVID MARANISS, THEY MARCHED
to Johnson's chagrin) that the unrest had been fueled by "systemic racism, unemployment, and police brutality." 24 Nevertheless, it was superficially difficult to dismiss the potential connection that existed between the rebellious oratory of Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, among others, and these volatile urban uprisings. 125 When combined with the reality that casting blame on such "rabble rousers" seemed like a much more satisfying and politically astute strategy, it is easy to understand why various leaders viewed prosecution of Carmichael and Brown as an efficacious solution.
6
During a notably intense Cabinet meeting on August 2, 1967, the principal topic for discussion was the issue of whether Carmichael and Brown could be indicted on federal charges for conspiracy to incite riots. 12 7 In his report to the Cabinet regarding the recent riots in Detroit and elsewhere, Ramsey Clark concluded that there was "no hard evidence of a Negro conspiracy." 128 Though he conceded, "we know there are lots of leaders and roving trouble-makers[J" he attributed much of the severity of the unrest to overreactions by "irres onsible officials"-"There is panic ... fear ... overreaction and deadly error." 1 2
Secretary of State Dean Rusk retorted somewhat incredulously: "Don't we have any remedy for these people?" 130 135 In the end, the bottom line seemed to be that as unsettling as Carmichael's and Brown's words and methods may have been to many, they simply did not rise to the level of conspiracy to incite a riot.
13 6 Indeed, the President's Cabinet, Clark included, ultimately acknowledged that local law may have presented the most viable option for pursuing Carmichael and Brown-"It isn't the end of the road to say that we can't prosecute Brown and Carmichael.... The local laws can catch them .
".137
President Johnson, however, remained hesitant to abandon completely the conspiracy theory at this point: "I don't want to foreclose the conspiracy theory now.... Keep that door open.... Even though some of you will not agree with me, I have a very deep feeling that there is more to that than we see at the moment." 
").
133. See MCPHERSON, supra note 131, at 363 ("[T]he evidence for conviction was not there, and acquittal, Clark believed, would exalt Carmichael as nothing else."); McPherson Interview, supra note 16 (" [Clark] was afraid that he would haul them up in Court and any competent judge, or certainly a Court of Appeals, would reverse or acquit them.").
134. Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
136. See Clark Interview V, supra note 96 ("I think [President Johnson] was outraged by Carmichael .... I think he thought it would be very good for the country if we could stop that. My position was just a legal position. We didn't have the facts that as applied to the law demonstrate[d] guilt of any crime.").
137. Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Frustration over the inability to federally prosecute Stokely Carmichael for his alleged involvement with the riots helped inspire subsequent legislation specifically designed to cover "inciteful" activities, such as his 138. Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 139. See MCPHERSON, supra note 131, at 363 (" [McPherson] was worried that unless Carmichael were prosecuted the government, with its commitment to peaceful change, would be made a goat ....
Johnson had the same concern, but he abided Clark's judgment."); WILKINS, supra note 9, at 204 (describing Ramsey Clark as "the guy Johnson was furious at because he wouldn't put Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael in jail"); Flamm, supra note 97, at 136 (observing Given this, it is difficult to understand why the focus of Carmichael's --140 criminal investigation was limited to conspiracy to incite riots. There seemed to have been more than ample evidence to support a charge for aiding and abetting "another to refuse or evade registration or service" in violation of Section 462 of the SSA.141 Why did Clark not pursue Carmichael on this basis, particularly in light of Clark's contemporaneous prosecution of the Boston Five on a similar ground? An objective comparison of the evidence against the Boston Five and Carmichael suggests that a decision to prosecute him would have been equally, if not more, justified.
C. Aiding and Abetting Draft Evasion: Stokely Carmichael v. The Boston Five
Section 462 of the SSA is a comprehensive provision that, among other things, makes it unlawful for any person to evade or refuse "registration or service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this [Act], or [to] knowingly counself [, aid [, or contended that Carmichael's "prosecution would put other militants on notice that there is a limit to treasonous activities against the United States," Ramsey Clark maintained that this would only serve to make Carmichael a martyr. Id. United States145 and United States v. Millerl46 for conduct akin to Carmichael's, and maintained that if those defendants could be prosecuted for their actions, Carmichael's prosecution should have been a foregone conclusion. 147 In particular, according to O'Meara, "Carmichael's language [was] more violent, more provocative, more likely to inflame young men against conscription and to defy the draft than the statements made by Schenck and Miller." 148 Though the acerbic tone and overtly anti-Communist theme of the Dean's article undermined its credibility,149 his substantive position was certainly not without some merit.
Stokely Carmichael unabashedly challenged young men to stand up to the American government and to refuse to participate in the Vietnam War. 15 He was the very embodiment of the anti-Vietnam and anti draft movement, the standard bearer for the war resisters' mantra-"Hell no, we won't go!" 51 His antiwar rhetoric was even stronger with respect to black men.152 In Carmichael's view, no one should fight in "LBJ's racist war," 153 but black men, especially, had no business taking up arms abroad for the sake of democracy when they were not afforded equal access to so-called democratic freedoms at home 1 54 and, indeed, were the subject of unequal treatment and overt racism within the military seriously considered pursuing him in this regard.156 Instead, he opted to prosecute five far less volatile anti-Vietnam activists for their "aiding and abetting" activities. 157 The gist of the charges was that the defendants "did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other ... to unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully counsel, aid and abet" various violations of the SSA by Selective Service registrants, including their evasion of service in the armed forces. 158 Nicknamed the Boston Five because of their Boston-based prosecution in the federal district court in Massachusetts, 15 9 the group consisted of five respected white men who had independently undertaken active, peaceful opposition to the Vietnam War.
0
Defendant Mitchell Goodman was a novelist and professorl61 who was instrumental in organizing two of the most critical events that led to the charges brought against the Boston Five. The first event was a major press conference held on October 2, 1967 (Overt Act No. 2 of the indictment), orchestrated to publicize all of the anti-draft activities that were taking place.162 In addition, Goodman was the principal force behind a demonstration on October 20, 1967 (Overt Act No. 11), during which a briefcase full of draft cards and other draftrelated materials was delivered to the Department of Justice. Hence, it seems evident that Clark directed no meaningful attention towards the prospect of pursuing Carmichael on the basis of any charge related to aiding and abetting draft evasion. See O'Meara, supra note 5, at 1109.
157. See Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 251-52. Interestingly, from a timing standpoint, the allegations against the Boston Five were based on activities that reportedly commenced on August 1, 1967, one day before the President's heated cabinet meeting. Id. at 251; see also supra text accompanying note 127.
158. Id. at 251-52. 159. See Saunders, supra note 43, at 44 ("[T]he five, called the Boston Five because they were tried in federal court there, had never been in the same room together before the trial."). The lead defendant in the indictment was the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr., the highly respected Chaplain at Yale University and a noteworthy activist for individual rights.
1 64 He was particularly engaged in opposing the Vietnam War, delivering numerous fiery speeches that openly flouted the draft laws through blanket calls for resistance. 65 One such address was made in conjunction with the October 20 demonstration that Goodman coordinated. In that speech, Coffin proclaimed the following from the steps of the Justice Department:
We hereby publicly counsel these young men to continue in their refusal to serve in the armed forces as long as the war in Vietnam continues, and we pledge ourselves to aid and abet them in all the ways we can. This means that if they are now arrested for failing to comply with a law that violates their consciences, we too must be arrested, for in the sight of that law we are now as guilty as they. 166 Defendant Michael Ferber, a Harvard Ph.D. candidate at the time, was the youngest of the Boston Five and a dedicated member of the student-dominated "Resistance" movement.167 His defining criminal act for the government's case against him took the form of an address delivered on October 16, 1967, titled "A Time to Say No." 168 In that speech, Ferber directed unequivocal appeals for draft avoidance to his listeners:
Let us make sure we are ready to work hard and long with each other in the months to come, working to make it difficult and politically dangerous for the government to prosecute us, working to help anyone and everyone to find ways of avoiding the draft, to help disrupt the workings of the draft and the armed forces until the war is over.169
The fourth defendant, Marcus Raskin, was perhaps the most low-key of the five, though equally strident in his opposition to the war.170 He served in the Kennedy Administration and later co-directed the Institute for Policy Studies in note 11, at 40-44. See also BRANCH, supra note 73, at 646-47 (recounting the scene of Coffin delivering the briefcase full of draft cards to Assistant Deputy Attorney General John McDonough).
164. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 39-40 (discussing Coffin's activism during the 1960s). 165. See id. at 37 (describing a post-indictment speech that Coffin delivered as "a good deal milder than any of his speeches subsequently offered in evidence at the trial").
166. MITFORD, supra note 11, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). Coffin's speech comprised Overt Act No. 6 of the indictment against the Boston Five. Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 254.
167. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 18-20. For a discussion of the origins and mission of the Resistance movement, see id. at 25-28.
168. Id. at 28; Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 254. 169. MITFORD, supra note 11, at 28-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 45-50.
Washington, D.C. 17 1 In 1965, he co-authored The Viet-Nam Reader, 17 which presented a history of the conflict and sought to demonstrate why and how the U.S. should withdraw.
3
More significantly, Raskin and Arthur Waskow drafted and issued a document entitled "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority" 1 74 Overt Act No. I in the indictment.
175 The "Call" was addressed to "the young men of America, to the whole of the American people, and to all men of good will everywhere," 176 and sought to have them formally join in and pledge their support for the war resistance movement. 177 Among other things, it articulated and advocated the position that "every free man [had] a legal right and a moral duty to exert every effort to end [the] war, to avoid collusion with it, and to encourage others to do the same." 1 78
The last, but certainly not the least, of the defendants was renowned pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock, the author of The Common Sense Book ofBaby and Child Care,179 one of the bestselling books of all time. so Although his antiwar activities were quite visible and extensive, 181 the government concentrated on his involvement in three of the incidents already mentionedthe October 2, 1967 press conference that Mitchell Goodman organized; the October 20, 1967 demonstration at the Department of Justice; and the issuance of "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority." REV. BOOKS, Oct. 12, 1967, at 7) (noting that although there were other drafts of this document circulating around the country, theirs "was the final one that incorporated the others" and was published in The New York Review ofBooks and distributed to members of the antiwar movement). It should be noted that the indictment avers that defendants Coffin and Spock distributed the "Call." Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 254. 183. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 35, at 383-84 (observing that the government's "chances of ultimately prevailing would [have been] significantly higher if it [had] charged a substantive or accessory crime rather than a tenuous conspiracy among strangers"). But see HARRIS, supra note 103, at 63 ("Conspiracy charges are fairly common legal devices-to a degree, because they're easier for the prosecution." (internal quotation marks omitted)); MITFORD, supra note 11, at 63-67 (discussing various potential advantages associated with conspiracy charges).
HeinOnline --62 S. C. L. Rev. 27 2010-2011 instead chose to pursue a far more insubstantial conspiracy theory-one that ultimately did not carry the day in court. 184 It is not clear why the government did this or, more importantly, why it singled out these defendants to the exclusion of numerous other potential targets who were engaged in equally unlawful behavior. 185 One theory is that the indictment was a response to an ill-advised memorandum and explanatory letter issued to all local draft boards by Selective Service Director Lieutenant General Lewis Hershey, in which he essentially decreed that draft eligible resisters should be declared delinquent, denied deferment, and reclassified for immediate induction.186 Because of the outrage that ensued over these draconian directives, 187 Ramsey Clark and General Hershey released a joint statement announcing the formation of a special unit within the Justice Department devoted to investigating and prosecuting, on a much narrower scale, violations of the Selective Service laws, "with special attention to violations of the 'counsel, aid, or abet' provisions."
The head of this special unit, John Van de Kamp, acknowledged that the prosecution of the Boston Five represented an effort to save face after the Hershey debacle and that the government selected these defendants because of their notoriety and the large quantity of public evidence available against them.189 In addition, one commentator has suggested that the indictments may have been an effort "to send a message that although criticism of the war and the 184. See infra notes 206, 209. Some have contended that the five defendants had little personal interaction with one another prior to the indictment and apparently had never come together as a group until that time. See FOLEY, supra note 163, at 228; MITFORD, supra note 11, at 5 ("When for the first time all five met together-after the indictment, in attorney Leonard Boudin's living room, to discuss their common plight-Boudin says the first thing he felt he could do for these conspirators was to introduce them to each other."); Saunders, supra note 43, at 44 (indicating that they "had never been in the same room together before the trial").
185. See FOLEY, supra note 163, at 231 (listing other potential targets that the government could have indicted).
Texts ofLetter and
Memo on the Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1967, at 2; see also GEORGE draft would be tolerated, 'inducing or procuring evasion' would not." 1 90 These explanations, of course, do not address the rationale for the conspiracy theory, nor do they adequately explain why the government selected the Boston Five over other well-known and possibly more notorious flouters of the aiding and abetting proscription, such as Stokely Carmichael. 191 Besides the two foregoing hypotheses, Ramsey Clark has offered several alternative, but conflicting, rationales for the Boston Five's prosecution.192 One position is based on the notion that it is the obligation of the Department of Justice to prosecute violations of the law-"[I]f the law says that you cannot do this and you do it, then you've got an obligation to enforce the law." 93 According to him, the Boston Five's patent violation of the letter of the Selective Service laws necessitated prosecution-a failure to charge them would have effectively robbed the system of integrity.194 Interestingly, Clark has also maintained that this prosecutorial argument supported his refusal to pursue Stokely Carmichael, ostensibly because, in his judgment, the factual basis for a violation was lacking.
19 196. Clark Interview V, supra note 96; see also HARRIS, supra note 103, at 63 ("As the nation's chief law-enforcement officer, I had the duty to prosecute Spock and the others when, in my judgment, the facts showed a violation of the law. If you don't enforce the law, it becomes shapeless." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
"deliberately endeavoring to destroy the Selective Service System." 197 It seems difficult to maintain, however, that this characterization meaningfully distinguishes their efforts from those of other anti-Vietnam War activists. In Clark's own words, if the facts support a violation of the law, the nature of the strategy that may have motivated the offense should be irrelevant. 1 98 Furthermore, even though Stokely Carmichael's passionate exhortations for young black men to refuse military service were assuredly inspired more by impatience with the slow pace of racial progress in America than by a desire to bring down the Selective Service System, that did not alter the putatively unlawful nature of his behavior.
More recently, Clark has proffered another interesting take on his prosecution of the Boston Five, suggesting that his desire to provide a forum for debating the efficacy of the draft was the stimulus. One final view is that Clark targeted the Boston Five because he could not feasibly prosecute everyone who was violating the draft laws at that time.203 According to him, the number of draft evaders was staggering, and he was far more interested in pursuing those who were "aiding and abetting" this evasion than the actual evaders themselves.204 Clark now maintains that he wanted to test the efficacy and enforceability of the "counsel, aid and abet" provision and therefore deliberately selected a handful of people who had a high level of participation in major antiwar demonstrations.
Ostensibly, this winnowing 206 process, combined with Clark's perplexing choice of a conspiracy theory and his preference for prosecuting individuals who could afford adequate 207 representation, ultimately led to the selection of the Boston Five. The multiple, conflicting explanations for the case against the Boston Five certainly raise legitimate questions regarding the basis for, and propriety of, their prosecution.208 All the same, it does not necessarily follow that pursuing charges against them constituted an inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion on the part of Ramsey Clark. Probable cause clearly was present and the government initially obtained convictions with regard to four of the 209 defendants, which suggests that the decision to prosecute, taken in isolation, may have been entirely justified. 210 with anyone besides lawyers in the Department of Justice. He didn't find out about the Spock case until it was announced in the press.").
203. Cf DAVIS, supra note 21, at 13 ("There are not enough resources in any local criminal justice system to prosecute every alleged criminal offense.").
204 at 384-87 (discussing possible theories for the government's conspiracy charge). 207. See Saunders, supra note 43, at 45 (noting that long after the case was over, Clark reportedly told Coffin that he "had a choice to arrest a hundred students or select five people who could take financial care of themselves" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Clark, supra note 199, at 925 ("Dr. Spock and the other four defendants could present the best defense the law offered."); cf THOMAS HAUSER, MUHAMMAD ALI: His LIFE AND TIMES 174-75 (1991) (discussing Ramsey Clark's difficulty related to his decision to prosecute Muhammad Ali for draft evasion and noting that one positive aspect of the case was that "there was power on both sides to shape and test the issues").
208.
See, e.g., WILKINS, supra note 9, at 231 (observing that although Wilkins was not involved in the decision to prosecute the Boston Five, he believes it to have been "one call that [Clark] would like to have back").
209. Defendant Raskin was the only member of the Boston Five acquitted at trial. MITFORD, supra note 11, at 45. It should be noted, however, that on appeal, the convictions of Spock and Ferber were overturned, and the government declined to retry Coffm and Goodman. Saunders, supra note 43, at 45. 210 . In a memorandum directed to Ramsey Clark concerning the sentencing of the four members of the Boston Five who were convicted, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold stated the The problem is, however, that one cannot reasonably conduct a solitary assessment of the Boston Five prosecution. The unlawful actions at issue were not unique-there were other offenders whom the government could have prosecuted for the same alleged misconduct, even after taking into account the various prosecution-narrowing considerations that may have been utilized.211 As a result, Ramsey Clark's decision did not merely boil down to whether or not to prosecute those particular men, it also involved an element of choice-as between multiple potential targets, whom should he pursue?
IV. SELECTIVE NON-PROSECUTION Without question, prosecutors are enormously powerful. 212 As Attorney General Robert Jackson famously said in his 1940 speech to a gathering of U.S. attorneys: "The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous."213 Among the array of potent discretionary decisions that prosecutors are authorized to The point of Griswold's memo was to convey his view that the convictions alone were enough and that pursuing severe penalties would be a mistake. See id. Clark certainly agreed, see Clark, supra note 199, at 925, but the judge in the case did not. In sentencing the four defendants, the judge maintained that:
It is the view of this Court that it is reasonably inferrable that the defendants here played some material part in inciting certain draft evaders to flout the law. It would be preposterous to sentence young men to jail for violation of the Selective Service Act and allow those who, as the jury found, conspired to incite Selective Service registrants to take action to violate the law and who, it is reasonable to conclude, were instrumental in inciting them to do so, to escape under the guise of free speech. render,214 none is more important or more insulated from review than the decision to charge. 2 15 Jackson referred to it as "the most dangerous power of the prosecutor"-the danger being "that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted." 2 16 Along the same lines, another commentator has gone so far as to suggest that a "federal prosecutor is virtuallK free to charge anyone he chooses with any crime that strikes his fancy.
While these assessments may sound rather exaggerated, they are actually highly representative of the widely held perception that some prosecutors wield their awesome power in an arbitrary and unchecked manner. Claims that prosecutors have abused their discretion by wrongfully charging or "overcharging"219 particular defendants are not uncommon20-though disturbingly unlikely to result in professional discipline. 
218.
See DAVIS, supra note 21, at 16 ("The lack of enforceable standards and effective accountability to the public has resulted in decision-making that often appears arbitrary, especially during the critical charging and plea bargaining stages of the process."); id. at 286 (observing that the ethical rules do not prohibit overcharging and that because "the probable cause standard is so easy to achieve, an unethical prosecutor may bring an indictment against an individual even if she knows that she ultimately will not be able to prove that person's guilt").
219. "Overcharging" refers to "a practice that involves 'tacking on' additional charges that [prosecutors] know they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt or that they can technically prove but [that] are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise inappropriate." Id. at 31; cf STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.9(f) (1992) ("The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial or than are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense.").
Prosecutors who decline to initiate criminal proceedings, on the other hand, are typically not viewed as having arbitrarily exercised their discretion and, therefore, are even less likely to have such decisions meaningfully examined-"[ilf a prosecutor decides not to prosecute a case, there is no judicial recourse to compel prosecution." 222 A host of reasons have traditionally been accepted as valid grounds for foregoing prosecution, including finite resources, the relatively minor nature of an offense, a willingness to cooperate, and the absence of a criminal record. 223 Indeed, the only potential problem presented by a refusal to prosecute would be if other similarly culpable offenders were prosecuted on some unconstitutionally arbitrary basis, such as race. 224 Otherwise, "a prosecutor under his broad discretionary mandate generally is entitled to sin le out for prosecution one ... sus ect[] and decline to prosecute . . others," 2 2 so long as probable cause exists.
And this is concededly the norm, as successful challenges based on so-called "selective prosecution" are exceptionally rare in 220. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 20 (manuscript at 6) (observing that "dubious charging decisions involving innocent suspects do not exist purely in the world of hypothetical cases" and proceeding to discuss the Duke Lacrosse prosecution). light of the demanding legal standard employed, which requires a showing of discrimination in both effect and purpose.
Nevertheless, the facts and circumstances surrounding Ramsey Clark's prosecution of the all-white Boston Five, to the exclusion of Stokely Carmichael, supply a highly plausible basis for maintaining that Clark may have engaged in selective prosecution, albeit in a reverse discriminatory sense. Of course, the manner in which he evaded bringing charges against Carmichael has the aura of validity, but on closer examination, that perception blurs. Namely, by focusing on the crime of conspiracy to incite a riot, rather than aiding and abetting draft evasion (or "conspiracy" to do so), Clark was able to represent legitimately to President Johnson and other Carmichael condemners that the necessary evidence-evidence to establish a causal link between the "inciteful" oratory and the riots-was lacking.
2 2 8 Clark, however, likely would have viewed such a charge with a healthy dose of informed skepticism, even absent the alleged lack of evidence.
Specifically, Clark would have understood better than almost anyone that the root cause of the riots was far deeper than the mere words of any one activist, given his involvement with the investigation into the Watts riots and other similar instances of urban racial unrest.
9
As noted earlier, the Johnson Administration never released his graphic report on the Watts riots, perhaps because it contained a story that President Johnson and others would have preferred not be told.
2 3 0 As a result, it is not beyond reason to posit that Ramsey Clark may have been endeavoring to send a not-so-subtle message by demonstrating that the government could not successfully prosecute Carmichael 227. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 20-21 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)) ("As a practical matter, however, the Supreme Court has made it exceptionally difficult for a defendant to defeat a criminal prosecution on the grounds of invidious discrimination. To make out a selective prosecution claim, a defendant must show both discriminatory effect (that is, that persons of other races, religions or genders were equally subject to prosecution but were not charged) and discriminatory purpose (that is, the prosecutor made his charging decision on the basis of the defendant's race, sex, or religion)."); Moore, supra note 215, at 388 ("Having the right to file a motion claiming selective prosecution based on race or other impermissible grounds offers little protection to a defendant. Indeed, the trend of courts has been to increasingly limit the application of this remedy."); Ellen S. Podgor & Jeffrey S. Weiner, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Alive and Well, and Living in Indiana?, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 657, 661 (1990) (assessing unsuccessful selective prosecution claims in Indiana, maintaining that "the burden of proof placed upon the claimant to show current discriminatory intent results in an insurmountable burden that virtually emasculates the meritorious allegations"); Podgor, supra note 23, at 463 (citing Podgor & Weiner, supra, at 661) ("[F]ew cases successfully prove selective prosecution on the part of the prosecutor."). It is also significant to note that the defendant's onerous burden in proving selective prosecution is further compounded by the demanding standard imposed for obtaining discovery from the government in support of such a claim. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468 ("The justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim.").
228. for conspiracy to incite a riot. Conceivably, this was a clever subterfuge intended to force President Johnson and other members of the Administration to acknowledge the real problems at the core of the riots in Watts and other urban areas.231 Whatever Clark's true motivation, it is hard to imagine that he took seriously the prospect of indicting Stokely Carmichael for conspiracy to incite a riot.
232
Furthermore, the fact that Clark apparently gave no significant consideration to the possibility of charging Carmichael with the crime of aiding and abetting, or "conspiracy to aid and abet" SSA violations, suggests that Clark really did not want to prosecute Carmichael, period. 233 Clearly, had the desire been there, he could have done so because the existence of probable cause seemed 234 irrefutable.
Hence, the question that still lingers is: Why would Clark fail to pursue Carmichael on this basis? Stokely Carmichael's very words may provide some insight regarding one possible answer.
In the same 1966 speech quoted at the beginning of this article, Carmichael noted that the philosophers Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre posed the question of whether or not it is possible for a man to condemn himself. 235 Though they apparently failed to provide a response, black existentialist Frantz Fanon did-concluding that the answer was "no."
236 Carmichael agreed and proceeded to use as an example the infamous Philadelphia, Mississippi murders of civil rights workers James Chaney, Mickey Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman in 1964.
According to Carmichael, the local white community did not condemn those responsible for the murders because to condemn them would have been tantamount to condemning themselves-he maintained that they had elected the sheriff and his deputies to do precisely what they had done.
238
Although I am not sure that I completely accept Fanon's theory as Carmichael employs it in this example, it does have some appeal and potential legitimacy when applied to Ramsey Clark's refusal to prosecute Carmichael. For Clark, charging Carmichael would have been akin to condemning himself, given his plain identification with the plight of black Americans,239 as well as his openness to Carmichael's views on race and black resistance to the Vietnam 
239.
See HARRIS, supra note 103, at 15 (during an appearance on the Today Show, Clark stated that as Attorney General "I have the responsibility for enforcement of the civil-rights laws-a responsibility, I might add, I cherish. I think it's essential to the future of this nation that we vigorously enforce those laws."); supra Part II.A.
Five.245 In other words, if someone as incorruptible as him could make a grave error in judgment, it is highly probable that other prosecutors may do the same 246-possibly with far more dire consequences. Indeed, it is conceivable that Clark has devoted his entire post-government career to ferreting out such wrongs, trying to ensure that prosecutors seek justice in an independent and impartial manner. 247 While certainly a noble effort at atonement, if true, this theory fails to shed any light on the basis for Clark's evasive refusal to prosecute Stokely Carmichael and its problematic inconsistency with the rigid decision to pursue the Boston Five.
I firmly believe that the most credible explanation, valid or not, was race. Ramsey Clark's civil rights pedi ree and profound understanding of the plight of black Americans in the 1960s caused him to assess their putatively unlawful behavior on a scale of justice heavily weighted with a presumption in their favor. Blacks at that time clearly perceived the "law" as a tool of oppression, used to subjugate them to an unequal stature in virtually every aspect of society. Hence, to Ramsey Clark, it would have been perverse to place blacks on equal footing with whites when the question was one of criminal culpability. In his mind, to be sure, this would have served only to reinforce their view of the unjust and oppressive nature of the law.
249
For Clark, the law must have integrity above all else. 250 His refusal to prosecute Stokely Carmichael, as curious as it may seem in retrospect, was entirely consistent with this sacred ideal.
V. CONCLUSION
Broadly speaking, a prosecutor's role is not to secure convictions but to act as a "minister of justice." 2 51 On the one hand, in refraining from indicting
